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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON
STATE ABORTION STATUTES
One man's justice is another's injustice; one man's beauty
another's ugliness; one man's wisdom another's folly.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
There are -at least three possible federal constitutional limita-
tions on current state abortion statutes: (1) procedural due process,
(2) substantive due process, and (3) equal protection of the laws.
This Comment will critically evaluate these statutes in light of
procedural due process limitations resulting from recent treatment
by the courts. Yet more than legal issues are involved. As the
federal district court in United States v. Vuitch stated: "The abor-
tion debate covers a wide spectrum of considerations: moral, ethi-
cal, social, economic, legal, political and humanitarian, as well as
medical."1I
To gain an introductory understanding of the term "abortion",
a look at a rough portrait and summation in 1970 of abortion
statutes in America is illuminating:
In American society a woman who finds herself carrying an
unwanted pregnancy has several alternatives. She can carry the
baby to term and make the best of it. Or, she can seek out a
criminal abortionist who will terminate her pregnancy for a price.
Or, if she can afford it, she might take a brief vacation to a
foreign country where she would have little difficulty in obtaining
a safe abortion. She can also try to obtain a legal abortion in this
country by proving she is sick enough to have her pregnancy
terminated on medical grounds. 2
Abortion statutes today offer a woman carrying an unwanted preg-
nancy several alternatives similar in their practical effect to those
above.
The term "abortion" in this Comment means acts taken by a
physician or other person to terminate a woman's pregnancy by
arresting the development of the fetus before the natural time of
birth. This definition includes abortions before and after "quicken-
ing"-the embryonic movement after fourteen or more weeks of
pregnancy. Abortions are generally categorized as either criminal
or therapeutic. "Criminal abortion generally refers to any untimely
1. 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969).
2. Halleck, The Power of the Psychiatric Excuse, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 229, 234 (1970).
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delivery voluntarily procured with intent to destroy the fetus before
natural birth."' 3 But a "therapeutic abortion" does not indicate a
criminal act-rather a legal one. Such a phrase is commonly used
to designate abortions usually performed in a hospital, for medical
indications, and, under some statutes, for psychiatric indications.
In medical terminology, "abortion generally refers to the prema-
ture expulsion from the uterus of the products of conception at a
time before viability."' 4 The time of viability occurs at that stage
of development of the fetus when the fetus can live outside the
uterus, usually the twenty-sixth to the twenty-eighth week of preg-
nancy. 5 After that time, medical authorities use the terms "miscar-
riage"' or "premature labor ' 7 for premature expulsion of the
fetus.
It is the hope of this writer to place primary emphasis upon the
legal aspects in the abortion debate, but, at the same time, to show
his readers how each of the aforementioned considerations interacts
with them and is equally as important in arriving at possible solu-
tions to a failure of the law.
The concepts of procedural due process and substantive due
process constitute the two prongs of the important judicial doctrine
of unconstitutional uncertainty: "the doctrine which requires that
a criminal statute be sufficiently definite to give notice of the re-
quired conduct to those who would avoid its penalities and to guide
judge and jury in its application." 8 The application of this doctrine
may result in the unconstitutionality of a statute. Yet its applica-
tion encounters one inherent difficulty-the uncertainty of the doc-
trine itself. The notion "that a criminal statute be sufficiently defi-
nite" is necessarily subjective. As Justice Frankfurter has stated:
"[I]ndefiniteness" is not a quantitative concept. It is not even a
technical concept of definite components. It is itself an indefinite
concept. There is no such thing as "indefiniteness" in the ab-
stract, by which the sufficiency of the requirement expressed by
the term may be ascertained. 9
3. Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing), 60 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 3 (1969).
4. Id.
5. TAUSSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 21 (1936).
6. MALOY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 380 (1951).
7. Id.
8. Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195
(1955).
9. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
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The procedural due process uncertainty cases are those in which
a court is concerned with statutory language so incapable of under-
standing that it fails to give adequate warning to those subject to
its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudica-
tion. Thtis, in the often cited case, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court gave this standard:
No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids. The
applicable rule is stated in Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391: ". . And a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."' 0
On the other hand, the Court has cautioned against a far-reaching
application of the Lanzetta test. In United States v. Wurzbach, Mr.
Justice Holmes stated:
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each
other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be
uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he
does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal
law to make him take the risk."
Ordinarily, in procedural due process cases, the issue is quite
clear. Such cases
involve no question of whether the legislative body had a right to
make the prohibition; the question is whether it so expressed the
prohibition that the prospective defendant and the court which
would try him can understand the statute.12
10. 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). See also Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926). A more recent decision is Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), wherein
the Court stated, at 402-403: "It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of
the Due Process Clause if it . . . leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits
or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is
prohibited and what is not in each particular case."
11. 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930). See also United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946), where
the Court stated that even though there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to
determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls, this is not sufficient
justification to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. See generally
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
12. Collings, supra note 8, at 197.
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But, in these cases, the application of the unconstitutional uncer-
tainty doctrine is unclear:
Yet who would venture to divine what courts will or will not find
uncertain. To understand and rationalize the application of the
doctrine would require a philosopher's stone, for which one may
search in vain in the reported decisions. The more time spent in
trying to understand the doctrine, the less sure one becomes about
its content. 3
The recent abortion cases provide no exception.
As will be seen, abortion statutes involve a peculiar and per-
plexing series of dilemmas.
I. THE COURT'S DILEMMA
The application of a vague criminal statute presents a court
with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, no one should be
punished for conduct without knowing that it is criminal. On the
other hand, legislative pronouncements should not be lightly
nullified.
The very statement of this dilemma suggests at least two
alternatives for a court confronted with the application of a vague
criminal statute. First, it can assume that the legislature had
some purpose in mind, ascertain the purpose, and then apply the
statute to the situation at hand. ...
A second alternative is to refuse to apply the vague statute in
any case. To assume that a statute always has meaning may be
applauded by some as proper deference to the legislative will. On
the other hand, such an approach has disadvantages. It means
that the courts may have to struggle with badly drafted statutes
in countless cases. Would it not be better for all concerned if
application of an obscure statute was refused?
The problem becomes even more complicated when it is con-
tended in a federal court that a state statute is vague. A federal
court is naturally reluctant to undertake construction of a state
statute. In addition to the two alternatives above suggested, the
court might also decide to avoid any general conclusion and limit
its holding to a declaration that the statute was not applicable
under the particular facts."
The Supreme Court recently applied the procedural due process
uncertainty doctrine to a District of Columbia abortion statute in
13. Id. at 196.
14. Id. at 198 (footnotes omitted).
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United States v. Vuitch.15 Appellee Milan Vuitch, a licensed physi-
cian, was indicted in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia for producing and attempting to produce abor-
tions in violation of the District of Columbia abortion statute. That
statutory provision provides, in part:
Whoever, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or
other means whatever, procures or produces, or attempts to pro-
cure or produce an abortion or miscarriage on any woman, unless
the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life or health and under the direction of a competent
licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary not less than one year or not more than ten years .... 11
Before trial, District Judge Edward Weinfeld dismissed the indict-
ment on the ground that the abortion statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague. 17
In reversing the judgment of dismissal by the district court, the
Supreme Court chose to resolve its conflict by adopting the first
of the above three alternatives open to it. The Court sought to
provide a guide for adjudication in future cases, apparently imply-
ing that any set of judicially approved standards would be more in
accord with legislative intent than holding the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague. Thus, it assumed that Congress had some purpose
in mind by enacting the abortion statute and then ascertained what
that purpose might well have been:
When Congress passed the District of Columbia abortion law in
1901 and amended it in 1953, it expressly authorized physicians
to perform such abortions as are necessary to preserve the
mother's "life or health". Because abortions were authorized
only in more restrictive circumstances under previous D.C. law,
the change must represent a judgment by Congress that it is
desirable that women be able to obtain abortions needed for the
preservation of their lives or health."8
The District of Columbia abortion statute does not outlaw all
abortions, but only those which are not performed under the direc-
tion of a competent, licensed physician, and which are not neces-
sary to preserve the mother's life or health. Considerably narrow-
15. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
17. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
18. 402 U.S. at 70 (footnotes omitted).
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ing the vagueness issue to cover but a single word, the Supreme
Court considered
the contention that the word "health" is so imprecise and has so
uncertain a meaning that it fails to inform a defendant of the
charge against him and therefore the statute offends the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution."9
This narrowly framed issue was based on a single consideration in
regard to the vagueness question from the district court decision:
The word "health" is not defined and in fact remains so vague
in its interpretation and the practice under the act that there is
no indication whether it includes varying degrees of mental as
well as physical health.20
After noting that the legislative and judicial history of the statute
gave no guidance as to whether "health" refers to both a patient's
mental and physical state, 2' the Supreme Court adopted the con-
struction given to the District of Columbia statutory provision in
Doe v. General Hospital of the District oj Columbia, a decision
subsequent to the Vuitch district court decision. 2 In Doe, District
Judge Joseph Waddy construed the statute to permit abortions
"for mental health reasons whether or not the patients had a pre-
vious history of mental defects." 23 By construing the abortion stat-
ute in this way, the Court was able to dispose of the procedural due
process issue with unusual brevity:
We see no reason why this interpretation of the statute should not
be followed. Certainly this construction accords with the general
usage and modern understanding of the word "health", which
includes psychological as well as physical well-being. Indeed
Webster's Dictionary, in accord with that common usage, pro-
perly defines health as "the [s]tate of being sound in body or
mind." Viewed in this light, the term "health" presents no prob-
lem of vagueness.24
But the district court's holding that the District of Columbia
statute was unconstitutionally vague was based upon the applica-
tion of the procedural due process uncertainty doctrine to the statu-
19. Id. at 71.
20. 305 F. Supp. at 1034.
21. 402 U.S. at 71.
22. 313 F. Supp. 1170 (D.D.C. 1970).
23. Id. at 1174-1175, cited in 402 U.S. at 72.
24. 402 U.S. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
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tory phrase "as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life
or health." There the district court concluded:
Thus thephrase under discussion will not withstand attack for
it fails to give that certainty which due process of law considers
essential in a criminal state. Its many ambiguities are particularly
subject to criticism for the statute unquestionably impinges to an
appreciable extent on significant constitutional rights of individu-
als.?-
The concept of necessity for the preservation of the mother's health
physical or mental, was considered a nebulous and uncertain statu.
tory exception because
[n]o body of medical knowledge delineates what degree of mental
or physical health or combination of the two is required to make
an abortion conducted by a competent physician legal or illegal
under the Code. 26
Furthermore, the district court saw fit to state that "other uncer-
tainties in the [statutory] phrase. . . are discussed and documented
in People v. Belous. . .and need not be repeated here."' '
Such uncertainties were found by the California Supreme Court
in Belous28 in the then existing California abortion statute21 to re-
25. 305 F. Supp. at 1034 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 1034.
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. 71 Cal. 2d 954,458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
29. CAL. PEN. CODE § 274, when the conduct involved in Belous occurred, read:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman, or procures any
woman to take any medicine, durg, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument
or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such
woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprison-
ment in the State prison not less than two nor more than five years. (Emphasis
added.)
The statute was substantially unchanged since it was originally enacted in 1850. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 274 (1970), reflecting amendment by Stats. 1967, c. 327, p. 1523, § 3, reads:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman, or procures any
woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument
or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such
woman . . . except as provided in the Therapeutic Abortion Act. . .of the Health
and Safety Code, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. ...
The Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950-54 (Supp. 1970),
authorizes abortions "only" if the abortion takes place in an accredited hospital (§ 25921,
subd. (a)), the abortion is approved by a hospital staff committed (§ 25951, subd. (b)), and
there is "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physi-
cal or mental health of the mother" (§ 25951, subd. (c)(l)), or the pregnancy resulted from




volve around certain key language:
Dictionary definitions and judicial interpretations fail to pro-
vide a clear meaning for the words, "necessary" or "preserve".
There is, of course, no standard definition of "necessary to pre-
serve", and taking the words separately, no clear meaning
emerges. "Necessary" is defined as: "I. Essential to a desirable
or projected end or condition; not to be dispensed with loss,
damage, inefficiency, or the like; . . ." (Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary (2d ed.), unabridged.) The courts have recog-
nized that "'necessary' has not a fixed meaning, but is flexible
and relative."
The definition of "preserve" is even less enlightening. It is
defined as: "1. To keep or save from injury or destruction; to
guard or defend from evil; to protect; save. 2. To keep in existence
or intact;. .. To save from decomposition, . . .3. To maintain;
to keep up; . . ." (Webster's New International Dictionary,
supra.) The meanings for "preserve" range from the concept of
maintaining the status quo-that is, the woman's condition of life
at the time of pregnancy-to maintaining the biological or medi-
cal definition of "life"-that is, as opposed to the biological or
medical definition of "death".3
Belous held that the qualification "necessary to preserve" in the
California abortion statute before amendment in 1967 was not
susceptible of a construction that does not violate legislative intent
and that is sufficiently certain to satisfy due process requirements
without improperly infringing on fundamental constitutional
rights.3' Thus, both the Vuitch district court decision and Belous
adopted the second alternative: nullification of a legislative pro-
nouncement and refusal to apply the vague statute in any case.
In agreement with the holdings in the above two decisions are
three additional recent decisions. State v. Munson,32 a South Da-
30. 71 Cal. 2d at _ 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at - 458 P.2d at 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 357. Belous did consider three possible
interpretations of "necessary to preserve .. .life": (1) one which requires certainty or
immediacy of death (id. at - 458 P.2d at 198-203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358-63); (2) one which
determines the right to an abortion solely on the basis of the dangers of childbirth without
regard to the relative dangers of abortion (id. at - 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
364); and (3) one which permits abortions only when the risk of death due to the abortion
is less than the risk of death in childbirth (id. at - 458 P.2d at 204-205, 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 364-65). However, none of these were considered sufficient to sustain the statute.
The other part of the holding in Belous dealing with the infringement of fundamental
constitutional rights shall not be discussed in this Comment.
32. Cir. Ct., Pennington County, S.D., April 6, 1970. This case is quoted verbatim in
15 S.D.L. REv. 332-34 (1970).
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kota Circuit Court case, concluded that the language of the South
Dakota statute forbidding abortion "unless the same is necessary
to preserve her life"3' presents the same basis for invalidity.34 A
three-judge federal court, 3 in a per curiam opinion holding that the
Texas abortion statutes3 fail the vagueness test formulated by the
Supreme Court, narrowed in on the grave and manifold uncertain-
ties in the statutory standard as to whether an abortion was pro-
cured "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother": 37
How likely must death be? Must death be certain if the abortion
is not performed? Is it enough that the woman could not undergo
birth without an ascertainably higher possibility of death than
would normally be the case? What if the woman threatened sui-
cide if the abortion was not performed? How imminent must
death be if the abortion is not performed? Is it sufficient if having
the child will shorten the life of the woman by a number of years?
These questions simply cannot be answered.3 1
And another three-judge court in Doe v. Scott,39 by a 2-1 decision,
struck down an Illinois statute which sanctioned an abortion "nec-
essary for the preservation of a woman's life." '40
Yet the approach- of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Vuitch followed the reasoning of three federal court, three-judge
decisions prior to it. Babbitz v. McCann,41 a per curiam opinion,
held that the Wisconsin abortion statute in question42 was not vague
33. S.D. Comp. LAWS tit. 22, § 17-1 (1967).
34. State v. Munson, as quoted in 15 S.D.L. REv. at 333.
35. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
36. TEx. PEN. CODE § 1191-96 (1961).
37. TEx. PEN. CODE § 1196 (1961) provides: "Nothing in this chapter applies to an
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother."
38. 314 F. Supp. at 1223.
39. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1(b) (1969).
41. 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
42. Wis. STAT. § 940.04 (1969) provides in part as follows:
(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an
unborn child may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years
or both.
(2) Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following may be
imprisoned not more than 15 years:
(a) Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child. ...
(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:
(a) Is performed by a physician; and
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the
life of the mother; and
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or indefinite. In the court's opinion, "the word 'necessary' and the
expression 'to save the life of the mother' are both reasonably
comprehensible in their meaning"43 and the language "necessary to
save" is not "so vague that one must guess at its meaning."44 In
Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,5 the court,
by a 2-1 decision, held that the Louisiana statute which provides
for the removal of a physician's certification for "[p]rocuring,
aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion unless done for the
relief of a woman whose life appears in peril after due consultation
with another licensed physician"4 was not vague or indefinite. The
majority stated that in their opinion, the statute "allows the in-
duced abortion of an embryo or fetus to be performed without
sanction only when the life of the mother is directly endangered by
the condition of pregnancy itself," 47 and thus "the Louisiana stat-
ute makes express what is perhaps only implied in the Texas stat-
ute-that the abortion need only appear necessary, rather than
actually be necessary to be permissible. ' 48 And in Steinberg v.
Brown, 9 the court, by a 2-1 decision, rejected the contention that
the Ohio abortion statute 50 was unconstitutionally vague and indefi-
nite:
It appears to us that the vagueness which disturbs the plaintiffs
herein results from their own strained construction of the lan-
guage used, coupled with the modern notion among law review
writers that anything that is not couched in numerous paragraphs
of fine-spun legal terminology is too imprecise to support a crimi-
nal conviction. . . . The words of the Ohio statute, taken in their
ordinary meaning, have over a long period of years proved en-
tirely adequate to inform the public, including both lay and pro-
fessional people, of what is forbidden.5
(c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hos-
pital.
(6) In this section "unborn child" means a human being from the time of concep-
tion until it is born alive.
Babbitz held only that Wis. STAT. § 940.04(5) was not unconstitutonally vague.
43. 310 F. Supp. at 297.
44. Id. at 298.
45. 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
46. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(6) (Supp. 1971).
47. 318 F. Supp. at 1220.
48. 318 F. Supp. at 1221.
49. 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
50. OnlO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (1964). The statutory phrase in question reads:
"unless such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her life, or is advised by two physicians to
be necessary for that purpose."
51. 321 F. Supp. at 745 (citation omitted).
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This discussion of the court's dilemma in ruling on vague abor-
tion statutes cannot be closed without stressing one salient point.
As one professor of law has stated: "[T]he concept of 'preservation
of life' to a woman often cannot be clearly distinguished from her
interest in maintaining general good health. ' 52 Indeed, this same
point was made over thirty years ago in an English case, Rex v.
Bourne 3 where the court construed the then existing English law
which simply prohibited "unlawful abortion". Justice MacNagh-
ten made two noteworthy points in his jury instructions: (1) life
depends on health; and (2) it may be that if health is gravely im-
paired, "death" results. 54 One doctor summed up the significance
of this case in this manner:
If in light of this instruction the jury believed that bearing this
child of an act of assault would make the [fifteen year old] girl a
physical or mental wreck, then it could rightfully decree that Dr.
Bourne had operated for the purpose of preserving the life of the
[girl]. The jury reached a verdict of not guilty. Precedent was then
apparently established for giving a sweeping definition to the term
"preservation of life". If health is menaced by threat of preg-
nancy, then life itself may be threatened. 5
II. THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA
The doctrine of unconstitutional uncertainty operates on stat-
utes, but statutes are interpreted and applied by people. Present
abortion statutes offer little guidance to physicians faced with the
interpretation and application of such statutes in order to treat
their patients. As already discussed, "[m]ost states offer no statu-
tory guidelines to elucidate what constututes a threat to the preg-
nant woman's life, and the distinction between a danger to health
and probable danger to life is a nebulous one." 6 This state of
American law is precisely the kind of situation that the procedural
due process uncertainty doctrine is intended to prevent. By placing
the burden of decision to terminate a pregnancy upon the doctor,
current abortion statutes render the selection of the physician a
governing factor in securing permission to perform a therapeutic
52. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. Rav. 730 (1968), at 740.
53. [193813 All E.R. 615.
54. Id. at 620.
55. Comment, Therapeutic Abortion-The Psychiatric Indication-A Double-Edged
Sword?, 72 DICK. L. REv. 270, 276 (1968).
56. Lucas, supra note 52, at 748.
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abortion. Yet notwithstanding the inherent difficulty and import-
ance of making such decision, once a decision is made by the doctor
to perform a therapeutic abortion, the doctor is confronted by an
even greater burden, a dilemma purely the creation of the law:
The treating physician who believes an abortion is medically or
psychiatrically indicated thus finds himself threatened with be-
coming a felon as well as with the possibility of losing his right
to practice his profession if he errs in the legal interpretation of
a penal statute, the words of which have not been sufficiently
definite for courts to agree on their meaning. 57
A. Three Views on the Protection of the Physician
The late Justice Black, in writing the majority opinion" in
United States v. Vuitch,5 9 flatly refused to relieve the physician
from such dilemma. The Court did hold that under the District of
Columbia abortion statute,6" the burden is on the prosecution to
plead and prove that an abortion was not "necessary for the preser-
vation of the mother's life or health."61 But this was the extent of
the Court's protection for the physician faced with such an abor-
tion statute:
It would be highly anomalous for a legislature to authorize abor-
tions necessary for life or health and then to demand that a
doctor, upon pain of one to ten years' imprisonment, bear the
burden of proving that an abortion he performed fell within that
category. Placing such a burden of proof on a doctor would be
peculiarly inconsistent with society's notions of the responsibili-
ties of the medical profession. Generally, doctors are encouraged
by society's expectations, by the strictures of malpractice law and
by their own professional standards to give their patients such
treatment as is necessary to preserve their health. We are unable
to believe that Congress intended that a physician be required to
prove his innocence.12
Whether the Court even recognized the doctor's dilemma is an open
question. With a concluding observation of the Court no one can
disagree: "Indeed, whether a particular operation is necessary for
57. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (N.D. 11. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
58. The Chief Justice, Justice Harlan, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun joined on
the procedural due process issues in Vuitch.
59. 402 U.S. at 67-73.
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
61. 402 U.S. at 71.
62. Id. at 70-71.
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a patient's physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians
are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery is
considered. '6 3 But also, no one can disagree that if a physician errs
in his judgment, when an abortion is considered, he may become a
criminal.
Justice Stewart, dissenting on the procedural due process issues,
agreed with the majority in Vuitch that "statutes should be con-
strued whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality"64
yet argued for a different construction of the District of Columbia
abortion statute. In effect, he simply extended the reasoning of the
Court's opinion to its logical conclusion. Stewart reasoned that
under the District of Columbia statute the legal practice of medi-
cine in the District of Columbia includes the performing of abor-
tions, for the practice of medicine consists of doing those things
which, in the judgment of a physician, are necessary to preserve a
patient's life or health. Thus, it followed, in his opinion,
that when a physician has exercised his judgment in favor of
performing an abortion, he has, by hypothesis, not violated the
statute. To put it another way, I think the question of whether
the performance of an abortion is "necessary for the mother's life
or health" is entrusted under the statute exclusively to those li-
censed to practice medicine, without the overhanging risk of in-
curring criminal liability at the hands of a second-guessing lay
jury. I would hold, therefore, that "a competent licensed practi-
tioner of medicine" is wholly immune from being charged with
the commission of a criminal offense under this law. 5
Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, did not think the District
of Columbia abortion statute meets the requirements of procedural
due process. On the one hand, he agreed with the majority of the
Court
that a physician-within the limits of his own expertise-would
be able to say that an abortion at a particular time performed
on a designated patient would or would not be necessary for the
"preservation" of her "life or health".66
However, Douglas probed deeper into the physician's determina-
tion:
63. Id. at 72.
64. 402 U.S. at 96 (Stewart, dissenting).
65. Id. at 97.
66. 402 U.S. at 74 (Douglas, dissenting).
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That judgment, however, is highly subjective, dependent on the
training and insight of the particular physician and his standard
as to what is "necessary" for the "preservation" of the mother's
"life or health".
The answers may well differ, physician to physician. Those
trained in conventional obstetrics may have one answer; those
with deeper psychiatric insight may have another. Each answer
is clear to the particular' physician. 67
In disagreement with Stewart's dissent, Douglas read the District
of Columbia abortion law, as did the district court and the majority
of the Supreme Court, as requiring submission to court and jury
of the physician's decision:
If we could read the Act as making that determination conclu-
sive, not subject to review by judge and by jury, the case would
be simple, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART points out. But that
does such violence to the statutory scheme that I believe it is
beyond the range of judicial interpretation so to read the Act.68
Douglas noticeably recoiled from a judicial activist position so as
to leave to the experts the drafting of abortion statutes "that pro-
tect good-faith medical practitioners from the treacheries of the
present law." ' 69
Thus, while Douglas and Stewart disagreed in the mechanics,
they did not disagree that doctors need protection from the di-
lemma put upon them by current abortion laws.70 The importance
of the judiciary in helping physicians obtain this protection is con-
siderable, as retired Justice Tom C. Clark has indicated:
The increasing number of abortions subjects physicians to
increased dangers of liability for incorrectly interpreting a stat-
ute. It appears that doctors face an uncertain fate when perform-
ing an abortion. This uncertainty will continue unless the legisla-
tures or courts provide relief from liability. Very few states, if
any, will repeal all abortion laws as . . .recommended. . . .If
the medical profession is to be accorded complete protection it
will have to come through the judicial system. 7'
67. Id.
68. Id. at 74-75.
69. Id. at 80.
70. Accord, U.S. v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969), where the court
stated: "His [the physician's] professional judgment made in good faith should not be
challenged."
71. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 LOYOLA L.
REV. OF L.A. 1, 7 (1969).
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B. Therapeutic Abortions in Light of the Doctor-Patient
Relationship
The threat of prosecution is a substantial deterrent to a physi-
cian's performing an operation he believes to be best for his pa-
tient. Yet the very medical standard for the performance of a thera-
peutic abortion as well as any operation, that is, to do whatever
the physician believes to be best for his patient, remains an entirely
subjective one. 72 The difficulty of identifying the criteria being uti-
lized in granting therapeutic abortions is one consequence of this
subjective standard:
In practice, doctors are usually willing to recommend therapeutic
abortion when a woman has such a severe heart, respiratory or
urinary disease that there would be a considerable risk of her
dying if she had to carry the child to term. It is much harder to
know if abortions are granted when there is reasonable certainty
that carrying a child to term will make the mother's health worse,
but will not result in her death. It is quite likely that many doctors
recommend abortion in such instances, but they usually do so
quietly, and also, illegally.
At the present time it is very hard to know what criteria are
actually being utilized in granting therapeutic abortions on psy-
chiatric grounds. Policies differ from state to state and from
hospital to hospital. Some doctors will recommend therapeutic
abortion only when they are absolutely convinced that the patient
is gravely ill and suicidal. Others will recommend it when there
are far less ominus [sic] signs of psychological disturbance. 3
This difficulty in turn leads to the conclusion of one professor of
law that "[i]n any given penumbral case [under present abortion
statutes] the results reached by a large number of physicians may
be no more than personal inclination. . . ."7 Indeed, such conclu-
sion is inescapable considering the fact that each physician forms
his own individual medical opinion as to what is "necessary" for
the "preservation" of the mother's "life or health" and consider-
ing the types of questions each physician must face in forming his
opinion:
72. But see State v. Powers, 155 Wash. 63, 67, 283 P. 439, 440 (1929), and Common-
wealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944). Both of these cases stressed
the ability of the medical profession to set its own standards in a given community and
maintained that an ascertainable "general medical opinion" did exist in a community.
73. Halleck, supra note 2, at 234-35.
74. Lucas, supra note 52, at 748.
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A doctor may well remove an appendix far in advance of
rupture in order to prevent a risk that may never materialize.
May he act in a similar way under this abortion statute?
May he perform abortions on unmarried women who want to
avoid the "stigma" of having an illegitimate child? Is bearing a
"stigma" a "health" factor? Only in isolated cases? Or is it such
whenever the woman is unmarried?
Is any unwanted pregnancy a "health" factor because it is a
source of anxiety?
Is an abortion "necessary" in the statutory sense if the doctor
thought that an additional child in a family would unduly tax the
mother's physical well-being by reason of the additional work
which would be forced upon her?
Would a doctor be violating the law if he performed an abor-
tion because the added expense of another child in the family
would drain its resources, leaving an anxious mother with an
insufficient budget to buy nutritious food?
Is the fate of an unwanted child or the plight of the family
into which it is born relevant to the factor of the mother's
"health"? 5
Another consequence of the physician's subjective medical stan-
dard for the performance of therapeutic abortions was best illus-
trated in the classic study by Stanford Professors Packer and Gam-
pell. 71 That study demonstrated that reputable hospitals and physi-
cians knowingly perform illegal abortions. 77 The rationale seems to
be that
[p]hysicians, feeling strongly that the law is unfair, and knowing
that it is rarely enforced, often disregard the law on the assump-
tion that they are best qualified to make decisions in this area. 71
This is true even though the great majority of states authorize
revocation of a physician's license when he has committed, or par-
ticipated in, a criminal abortion, 79 making the threat of colleague
75. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 76 (Douglas, dissenting).
76. Packer and Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, I I
STAN. L. Rav. 417 (1959). Packer and Gampell submitted eleven hypothetical abortion
situations to twenty-nine representative California hospitals. Of these situations, two clearly
required abortion to save the life of the mother and hence were legal under the California
statute at that time. Two others were borderline, and the remaining situations were clearly
illegal. The results showed that no case, not even the one based upon purely socio-economic
reasons, was uniformly rejected.
77. See Ziff, supra note 3, at 9.
78. Id.
79. See statutes compiled in George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements
for Reform, in ABORTION AND THE LAW I (Smith ed. 1967).
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criticism very considerable in such a case. It cannot be doubted that
the bare fact of prosecution alone, coupled with pulpit denuncia-
tions, could wholly destroy a physician's practice and career re-
gardless of the outcome of his case before a high tribunal."0
But while some physicians knowingly perform illegal abortions
under these rarely enforced abortion statutes,81 other physicians are
undoubtedly inhibited from using their best medical judgment
under them. As a result, physicians from either of the above groups
are provided with inadequate criteria by which they can govern
their actions so as to be in accordance with the law and their best
medical judgment. Thus, present abortion statutes may be labeled
as "dead letter" laws which
far from promoting a sense of security in the community, which
is the main function of penal law, actually impairs that security
by holding the threat of prosecution over the heads of people
whom we have no intention to punish.12
C. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Delegation as Applied to a
Physician
In People v. Belous,83 the California court took a rather novel
approach to a problem stemming from the vagueness of the then
existing California abortion statute. 4 The court observed that
under the statute the doctor is, in effect, "delegated the duty to
determine whether a pregnant woman has the right to an abortion"
and also that the physician acts at his peril if he determines that
the woman is so entitled.8 5 Since the doctor is subject to prosecution
for a felony and to deprivation of his right to practice medicine if
his decision is wrong, he cannot be impartial but instead has a
"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a con-
clusion" that the woman should not have an abortion.86 Belous held
that this delegation of decision-making power to a directly involved
individual violates the Fourteenth Amendment:
80. Lucas, supra note 52, at 750.
81. For documentation of the unenforcement of present abortion laws in the United
States, see Comment, To Be or Not to Be: The Constitutional Question of the California
Abortion Law, 118 PA. L. REv. 643 (1970), at 657 n. 87.
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment at 151 (Tent. Draft. No. 9, 1959), cited
in Ziff, supra note 3, at 10.
83. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354.
84. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 before amendment in 1970, supra note 29.
85. 71 Cal. 2d at _ 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
86. Id.
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The inevitable effect of such delegation may be to deprive a
woman of an abortion when . . . she would be entitled to such
an operation, because the state, in delegating the power to decide
when an abortion is necessary, has skewed the penalties in one
direction; no criminal penalties are imposed where the doctor
refuses to perform a necessary operation, even if the woman
should in fact die because the operation was not performed.
The pressures on a physician to decide not to perform an
absolutely necessary abortion are . . . enormous, and because
section 274 authorizes-and requires-the doctor to decide, at his
peril, whether an abortion is necessary, a woman whose life is at
stake may be as effectively condemned to death as if the law flatly
prohibited all abortions.8 7
D. Conclusion-The Physician's Medical Judgment Should Be
Conclusive
In practice, it is obvious that the Hipprocratic Oath 8 is no
longer wedded to the medical profession. The concept of a physi-
cian's duty has become considerably broadened:
From a duty of treating the specific ills of a patient, this duty has
87. Id. As authority for this holding, the court cited Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927); State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 448, 254
P.2d 29 (1953); and Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235, 368
P.2d 101, 104, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 504 (1962). In Tumey, the responsibilities of a mayor in
a town included trying criminal cases, and his fees were derived from the fines imposed on
the defendants he convicted. The Supreme Court held this delegation of decision-making
power violated the defendant's right to due process because the mayor-judge had "a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case."
A recent law review article questioned the applicability of Tumey to Belous: Comment,
To Be or Not to Be: The Constitutional Question of the California Abortion Law, supra
note 81, at 657-58. The author argued first that a doctor has a substantial countervailing
incentive, that is, the immediate pecuniary interests, in combination with his personal sym-
pathies, might weigh in favor of operating as against his fear of prosecution. Secondly, while
a decision by an interested judge is obnoxious to the due process clause because a defendant
is bound thereby, in the case of an abortion, a woman could always continue to seek out a
doctor who would not be afraid to perform an abortion on her. "Therefore, since the effect
of the decision made by the doctor is considerably less severe, one should not apply to him
the same due process standards developed for the behavior of judges." The author also
pointed out that the California authorities cited by the court stated that legislative power
may be delegated if there is "an ascertainable standard" for its application. These authori-
ties would seem more in line with the holding in Belous.
88. The Hippocratic Oath reads: "[I pledge] not to give a deadly drug (pharmakon) to
anyone if asked for it, nor suggest it. Similarly, I will not give a woman an abortifacient
pessury. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art." THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH
3 (Edelstein ed. 1943), cited in Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 51 (1969), at 61.
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evolved in the minds of some leaders of the profession into a duty
of keeping the patient in "health". "Health" in this context is
understood to encompass not only freedom from physical disease
but also a state of good relations within a community network. 9
Perhaps, underneath the surface of Vuitch,0 lies a fear of this
broadened duty. As one professor of law has indicated:
If the physician is to seek health in this expanded, positive sense,
the matters subject to his professional good judgment are infinite.
If the state could not constitutionally regulate the exercise of that
judgment, legislators and courts alike would be superfluous, sup-
planted by a wise elite of doctors.9'
The real issue must be confronted-whether the state can chal-
lenge the physician's medical opinion that a therapeutic abortion
may or may not be performed on his patient or, in other words,
whether a physician may be convicted at all under such abortion
statutes as were previously discussed without a violation of proce-
dural due process. This writer is inclined to answer both statements
of the issue in the negative. Such conclusion is dictated by the
physician's interest in abortion law reform-an interest which not
only can but must be
asserted for authority to treat the patient according to his best
judgment, for freedom from the dangers of statutory vagueness,
for greater consistency between statutory standards and individ-
ual medical opinion, and for the protection of patients from the
dangers of incompetent criminal abortionists.12
III. TiH JURY'S DILEMMA
The jury, of course, faces a difficult dilemma in every criminal
case-whether or not to convict the accused. A vague criminal
abortion statute, though, requires submission to court and jury of
the physician's decision. The result of this submission is that very
lack of certainty which the doctrine of procedural due process
abhors:
The prejudices of jurors are customarily taken care of by chal-
lenges for cause and by peremptory challenges. But vagueness of
criminal statutes introduces another element that is uncontrolla-
89. Id. at 61-62 (footnotes omitted).
90. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
91. Noonan, supra note 88, at 62.
92. Lucas, supra note 52, at 750.
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ble. Are the concepts so vague that possible offenders have no safe
guidelines for their own action? Are the concepts so vague that
jurors can give them a gloss and meaning drawn from their own
predilections and prejudices? Is the statutory standard so easy to
manipulate that although physicians can make good faith deci-
sions based on the standard, juries can nonetheless make felons
out of them?9
3
The Supreme Court, in Vuitch, indicated no fear whatsoever of the
danger that jurors might convict doctors in any abortion case sim-
ply because some jurors believe all abortions are evil:
Of course such a danger exists in all criminal cases, not merely
those involving abortions. But there are well-established methods
defendants may use to protect themselves against such jury preju-
dice: continuances, changes of venue, challenges to prospective
jurors on voir dire, and motions to set aside verdicts which may
have been produced by prejudice. And of course a court should
always set aside a jury verdict of guilt when there is not evidence
from which a jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt.94
Thus, the expense of a lawsuit and of a corresponding appeal be-
come two by-products of the Supreme Court's insistence in its
belief that it is necessary to preserve vague criminal abortion stat-
utes. It appears that the subject of abortion presents one of those
areas where the jury hears the law as it is read but where it speaks
through its emotions, its religion, its ethical beliefs. And so a state
of jury lawlessness may exist whenever any person is tried under a
vague criminal abortion statute. As Justice Douglas has stated:
Abortion statutes deal with conduct which is heavily weighted
with religious teachings and ethical concepts. Mr. Justice Jackson
once spoke of the "treacherous grounds we tread when we under-
take to translate ethical concepts into legal ones, case by case."
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (dissenting opinion). The
difficulty and danger are compounded when religion adds another
layer of prejudice. The end result is that juries condemn what they
personally disapprove.
The subject of abortions-like cases involving obscenity-is
one of the most inflammatory ones to reach the Court. People
instantly take sides and the public, from whom juries are drawn,
makes up its mind one way or the other before the case is even
93. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 75 (1971) (Douglas, dissenting).
94. 402 U.S. at 72 n.7.
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argued. . . .The issue is volatile; and it is resolved by the moral
code which an individual has. That means that jurors may give
it such meaning as they choose, while physicians are left to oper-
ate outside the law. Unless the statutory code of conduct is stable
and in very narrow bounds, juries have a wide range and physi-
cians have no reliable guideposts. The words "necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life or health" become free-wheeling
concepts, too easily taking on meaning from the juror's predilec-
tions or religious prejudices.95
IV. CURRENT ABORTION STATUTES AND THE IMPACT OF THE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE
Four states presently allow by statute abortion on request or on
demand. New York is the only state that permits abortion on
request without a residency requirement.9" The other three states
permit abortion on request but have residency requirements:
Alaska-30 days;9 7 Hawaii-90 days;9" and Washington-90
days.99 Under the statutes of Alaska and Hawaii, abortions can be
performed only "to terminate the pregnancy of a nonviable
fetus."'00 But neither statute defines "nonviable fetus." Washing-
ton permits the termination of "a pregnancy of a woman not quick
with child and not more than four lunar months after concep-
tion." ' New York has a dual time limit for abortions: abortions
can be performed by a licensed physician (1) at any time when the
physician is "under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to
preserve her life" or, (2) "within twenty-four weeks from the
commencment of her pregnancy." 0 2 All four of these state statutes
require that the abortion be performed by a licensed physician.0 3
While Hawaii requires the abortion to be performed in a licensed
hospital, 104 the other three states allow more latitude. Alaska re-
quires that the abortion be performed "in a hospital or other facil-
95. 402 U.S. at 78-80 (Douglas, dissenting).
96. N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW § 125.05 (1971).
97. ALAS STAT. tit. 11, § 15.060(a) (1970).
98. HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 453-16(a)(3) (Supp. 1970).
99. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970).
100. ALAS STAT. tit. 11, § 15.060(a) (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 453-16(b)
(Supp. 1970).
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970).
102. N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW § 125.05 (1971).
103. ALAS. STAT. tit. 11, § 15.060(a) (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 453-
16(a)(1) (Supp. 1970); N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW § 125.05 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.02.060,9.02.070 (Supp. 1970).
104. HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 453-16(a)(2) (Supp. 1970).
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ity, approved for the purpose by the Department of Health and
Welfare or a hospital operated by the federal government or an
agency of the federal government." 1 5 Washington, likewise, re-
quires either that the abortion be performed in an accredited hospi-
tal "or at a medical facility approved for that purpose by the state
board of health," but in case of a "medical emergency," the preg-
nancy may be terminated elsewhere.' 6 New York apparently allows
abortions to be performed anywhere if done by a duly licensed
physician.0 7 With the exception of New York, these statutes ex-
pressly provide that a hospital or any person are neither required
to participate in an abortion nor liable for refusing to participate
in an abortion. 08 And only three of these statutes explicitly deal
with the issue of who is to give consent for the abortion to be
performed. New York requires merely the consent of the pregnant
woman;100 Washington requires the consent of the pregnant woman
"and, if married and residing with her husband or unmarried and
under the age of eighteen years, with the prior consent of her hus-
band or legal guardian, respectively";"0 but Alaska only requires
that "consent has been received from the parent or guardian of an
unmarried woman less than 18 years of age."'
The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute"2 has
provided the foundation for abortion law reform in thirteen states.
105. ALAS. STAT. tit. 11, § 15.060(a) (1970).
106. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970).
107. N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW § 125.05 (1971).
108. ALAS. STAT. tit. 11, § 15.060(a) (1970); HAWAII REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 453-16(d)
(Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (Supp. 1970). This type of statutory
provision shall hereinafter be referred to as an excuse section.
109. N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW § 125.05 (1971).
110. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970).
111. ALAS. STAT. tit. 11, § 15.060(a) (1970).
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(1)-(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The two
main sections are as follows:
(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely and unjustifiably termi-
nates the pregnancy of another otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony of
the third degree or, where the pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth, a
felony of the second degree.
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminating a preg-
nancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would
be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from
rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below
the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. Justifiable
abortions shall be performed only in a licensed hospital except in case of emergency
where hospital facilities are unavailable. [Additional exceptions from the requirement
of hospitalization may be incorporated here to take account of situations in sparsely
settled areas where hospitals are not generally accessible.]
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The states are Arkansas,113 California,' Colorado,15 Delaware,"'
Georgia," 7 Kansas, "' Maryland, 119 Mississippi,120 New Mexico,' 2 '
North Carolina, 22 Oregon, 23 South Carolina2 4 and Virginia.1as Six
of these states impose residency requirements: Arkansas-4
months except in the case of an emergency where the life of the
pregnant woman is in danger; 26 Delaware-120 days;' z- Geor-
gia-"bona fide legal resident of the State of Georgia;"1 North
Carolina-4 months with the same exception as that of Arkan-
sas; 2 South Carolina-90 days; 30 and Virginia-120 days.' 3' All
thirteen states have laws permitting abortion for some or all of
these grounds: (1) protection of physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman, (2) possible fetal deformity and (3) cases of felon-
ious intercourse. 32 Time limits for performing lawful abortions
113. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-303 to 41-310 (Supp. 1969).
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950-54 (Supp. 1970).
115. COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 2-50 to 2-52 (1967).
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1790-93 (1970).
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 to 26-1203 (1970). Acts 1968, p. 1249, which enacted
the Criminal Code of Georgia did not repeal these statutes, but neither did it incorporate
them as a portion of the official Criminal Code of Georgia. For this reason, the subject-
matter of these statutes may also be found in GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-9920 a and 26-9925 a
(1970).
118. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407 (Supp. 1970).
119. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149E, 149F, 149G (Supp. 1969).
120. MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1970).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-5-1, 40-A-5-2, 40-A-5-3 (Supp. 1969).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
123. ORE. REv. STAT. § 435A05-.495 (1969).
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp. 1970).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1970).
126. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-306 (Supp. 1969).
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1793 (1970). This statute provides exceptions from the
residency requirement for those females who are "gainfully" employed in Delaware at the
time of conception, or whose spouse is so employed, or to such female who has been a
patient, prior to conception, of a physician licensed by Delaware, or to such female who is
attempting to secure an abortion for the reason that the continuation of her pregnancy is
likely to result in her death.
128. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(1)(2) (1970).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 (Supp. 1970).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(a) (Supp. 1970).
132. All of these states, except California and Mississippi, permit abortions for all three
of these grounds. Their statutes are cited in notes 1 13-125, supra. The remaining eleven states
basically follow the language of the MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 230.3(l)-(3) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, 1962), with a few notable differences in language and, quite possibly, in applica-
tion. See Giannella, The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion Law, 13 VILL. L.
REv. 257 (1968) at 258 n.3, where the author argues that the Colorado law is stricter than
the MODEL PENAL CODE provision since in Colorado the pregnancy must threaten "serious
permanent impairment" of the woman's mental or physical health whereas the MODEL
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exist in only four of the thirteen states: California-20 weeks; 33
Colorado-16 weeks only if pregnancy resulted from rape or in-
cest;13 Delaware-20 weeks except if continuation of the pregnancy
is likely to result in the death of the mother or where the fetus is
dead; 35 and Maryland-26 weeks with same exception as in Dela-
ware.13 Twelve of these states require the abortion (1) to be per-
formed by a licensed physician, (2) in an accredited hospital, (3)
upon written certification in advance by a group of at least two
doctors. 37 Mississippi omits the hospital requirement but retains
PENAL CODE refers simply to grave impairment. The Colorado statute also differs from the
language of the MODEL PENAL CODE in that it refers to "the birth of a child with grave
and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation." COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 2-
50(4)(a)(i) (1967). Georgia provides that an abortion is lawful when performed by a physi-
cian, "based upon his best clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary because ... [tihe
fetus would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or physical
defect." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(a)(2) (1970). Virginia refers to "a substantial medical
likelihood that the child will be born with an irremedial and incapacitating mental or
physical defect." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1(c)(l)(ii) (Supp. 1970). Three state stat-
utes-ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-304 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(1)(2) (1970);
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969)-refer to the "health" of the pregnant woman. But
this standard offers no problem in light of the Supreme Court ruling in Vuitch which
construed the word "health" to refer to both the physical and mental health of the pregnant
female. Oregon is the only state that saw fit to grapple with the phrase "substantial risk."
The statute states that in determining whether or not there is substantial risk that continua-
tion of the pregnancy will greatly impair the physical or mental health of the mother,
"account may be taken of the mother's total environment, actual or reasonably foreseea-
ble." ORE. REv. STAT. § 435A15 (1969).
California does not provide any lawful abortions for eugenic reasons under its statutes.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (Supp. 1970). Mississippi only allows abortions
"where pregnancy was caused by rape" or by the familiar standard-"where necessary for
the preservation of the mother's life." Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1970).
It should be noted that eight of the thirteen states provide an additional ground for a
lawful abortion with some difference in language. Arkansas, North Carolina and South
Carolina refer to a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the
life of the woman, while Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico and Virginia refer
to the situation in which continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death of the
woman.
133. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950-54 (Supp. 1970).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 2-50 to 2-52 (1967).
135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1790-93 (1970).
136. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149E, 149F, 149G (Supp. 1969).
137. These statutes are cited in notes 113-119 and 121-125, supra. There are exceptions
to the second and third requirements in three states. Kansas also allows legal abortions to
be performed "in such other place as may be designated by law," but where "an emergency
exists which requires that such abortion be performed immediately in order to preserve the
life of the mother," there is no prior certification requirement. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407
(Supp. 1970). Oregon does not prevent a physician from performing an abortion if he
believes in good faith that the life of the pregnant woman is in imminent danger and there
is insufficient time to comply with these two requirements. ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.445
(1969). And Virginia allows abortions to be performed by a physician without compliance
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the other two.138 Eight of these states tackle the consent issue 3 1
while nine of them provide for excuse sections. 40
Abortion is permitted only when necessary to preserve the life
or health of the woman in Alabama,' Massachusetts12 and Wash-
ington, D.C. 4 3 Both Massachusetts and Washington, D.C., require
that such abortions be performed by a physician.'"
The great majority of states retain the ancient statutory excep-
tion to a criminal abortion: where the abortion is necessary "to
preserve"'4 5 or "for the preservation of"'' or "to save" 4 7 the life
with these two requirements where it is necessary, in the opinion of the physician, in order
to save her life. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1970). Where an emergency exists, three
states-Arkansas, North Carolina and South Carolina-allow the written certificate to be
filed with the hospital within 24 hours after the abortion. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-309 (Supp.
1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp.
1970).
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1970).
139. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-305 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 2-50 to 2-
52 (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1790-93 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-5-I, 40-
A-5-2, 40-A-5-3 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 435.435 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1970).
140. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3 10 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 2-50 to 2-
52 (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1791 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 to 26-1203
(1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149F (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-5-2
(Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.475, 435.485 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-89
(Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.2 (Supp. 1970).
141. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959).
142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956). This statute outlaws all unlawful
abortions, but, by case law, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that the term
"unlawfully", as used in the state abortion statute,
has been made sufficiently definite by decisions of this court. In our cases it has been
stated over the years that a physician may lawfully perform an abortion if he acts in
good faith and in an honest belief that it is necessary for the preservation of the life
or health of the woman.
Kudish v. Board of Registration, 356 Mass. 98, _ 248 N.E.2d 264, 266 (1969). See also
Commonwealth v. Brunello, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961) and Commonwealth v.
Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394,53 N.E.2d 4 (1944).
143. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
144. See the Massachusetts cases cited in note 142, supra; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201
(1967).
145. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-29 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.10 (1965);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 436.020 (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 617.18
(1963); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 559.100 (1953); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-401 (1969);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-405 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 585:12-13 (1955); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.16 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-3-1 (1969); S.D. Comp. Laws tit. 22, § 17-1 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1957).
Four states--Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nevada-also permit "abor-
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of the pregnant woman. Two of these states-Illinois and Wiscon-
sin-explicitly require that the abortion be performed by a physi-
cian14 while Missouri requires that the abortion either be per-
formed by a physician or advised by him as necessary to preserve
the life of the woman or her unborn child.'49 Illinois requires that
the abortion be performed in a licensed hospital or other licensed
medical facility'50 while Wisconsin requires it to be performed in a
licensed maternity hospital unless "an emergency prevents."''
Three states have similar criminal abortion statutes with a varia-
tion in statutory exceptions: Tennessee-unless the abortion "shall
have been done with a view to preserve the life of the mother;"' 52
Texas-"Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured
or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life
of the mother;"' 153 and West Virginia-"No person . . . shall be
punishable where such act is done in good faith, with the intention
of saving the life of such woman or child."'154
Two states-New Jersey and Pennsylvania-provide a similar
statutory exception for criminal abortion. New Jersey makes an
abortion criminal if done "maliciously or without lawful justifica-
tion"'' 5 while Pennsylvania makes an abortion criminal if "unlaw-
fully" administered. 56
Louisiana provides no exception, either by statute or by case
tions" necessary to preserve the life of the "unborn child" or "child". West Virginia's
statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966), also provides a statutory exception in favor
of the child. One writer believes such statutes are the result of a confusion in terminology:
"The obvious legislative intent would seem to be to exclude induced labor from the prohibi-
tions of the statute. In the medical sense, induced labor is not at all an abortion but a
procedure for any one of a myriad of medical indications." Comment, supra note 55, at
275.
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1964).
147. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); IOWA CODE § 701.1 (1950); Wis.
STAT. § 940.04 (1969).
148. These statutes are cited in notes 146-147, supra.
149. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 559.100 (1953).
150. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1969).
151. WIS. STAT. § 940.04 (1969).
152. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955).
153. TEx. PEN. CODE §§ 1191, 1196 (1961).
154. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966).
155. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1969). The phrase "lawful justification" in this
statute was interpreted in State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 244 A.2d 499 (1968), where the court
held the phrase was not vague if restricted to the necessity to preserve the mother's life.
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719 (1963). This statute has never been judicially




law for its criminal abortion statute. 157 Yet Louisiana does provide
by statute that the performance of an abortion is not a cause for
revocation of a medical license when "done for the relief of a
woman whose life appears in peril."' 58
Thus, in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, an abor-
tion may be a crime for the person who performs it. But in only
twelve states is the woman expressly subject to statutory criminal
prosecution for intentionally performing, or submitting to, a crimi-
nal abortion.1 59
In conclusion, the impact of the procedural due process doctrine
on those criminal abortion statutes which provide exceptions to
protect the pregnant woman's life or health remains considerable.
These statutes shall continue to be a source of constitutional con-
troversy until that certain set of dilemmas belonging to the court,
the jury, and the doctor and stemming from those statutes are
resolved in a manner more attuned to the realities of American life
in the late twentieth century and to its living Constitution. The
recent legislative attempts at resolving these dilem-
mas--encompassing those statutes based upon the Model Penal
Code and those allowing abortion on demand'---are certainly
more effective than other criminal abortion statutes in giving ade-
quate warning to those subject to their prohibitions as well as in
providing proper standards for adjudication. Yet uncertainty re-
mains the plague of criminal abortion statutes. Those statutes
based upon the Model Penal Code'6' face a familiar challenge:
157. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.87 (Supp. 1971).
158. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285 (1964).
159. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-212 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 275 (1970); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-30 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-602 (1948); MINN.
STAT. § 617.19 (1963); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-402 (1969). N.Y. REV. PEN.
LAW § 125.05 (1971) provides:
The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that
it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a reasonable belief
that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of her pregnancy.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-04 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 862 (1958); S.D. CoMlp.
LAWS tit. 22, § 17-2 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-2 (1953); Wis.
STAT. § 940.04(3)(4) (1969). MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(4) provides:
A woman whose pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth week commits
a felony of the third degree if she purposely terminates her own pregnancy otherwise
than by a live birth, or if she uses instruments, drugs or violence upon herself for that
purpose.
See 5 A.L.R. 788 and 131 A.L.R. 1323 concerning criminal responsibility of a woman on
whom an abortion is committed for conspiring to commit the crime.
160. These statutes are cited in notes 96-99 and 112-125, supra.
161. These statutes are cited in notes 112-125, supra.
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The Model Penal Code provides no accurate guide for physicians
who wish to obey the law, because such key words as "grave"
and "substantial" are nowhere defined. Physicians who termi-
nate pregnancies in good faith may find themselves criminally
liable if a jury later disagrees with their opinion as to whether a
particular pregnancy involved a substantial risk of gravely im-
pairing the health of the mother. Because the recommended stat-
ute is too vague, the procedural due process rights of physicians
are violated. 1 2
And even those seemingly clear abortion on demand statutes"3
contain uncertainty in that each of them, as well as four statutes
based on the Model Penal Code,'64 contains a time limit on the
performance of legal abortions; but such time limit is suspect from
the viewpoint of the procedural due process doctrine. As one doctor
observed about the California abortion statute:
Even the provision . . . that, "In no event shall the termination
be approved after the 20th week of pregnancy. . . ." leaves con-
siderable doubt. Does this refer to 20 weeks from conception or
20 weeks from the onset of the last menstrual period? How is this
time to be determined-by history obtained from the patient cor-
related by the findings on physical examination? Certainly. Yet
these dates are often inaccurate even in the most experienced
hands. Is the physician who delivers a live fetus while intending
to do an abortion liable to a charge of murder should the fetus
inevitably die? This is a question which remains unanswered.'
That the statutory language based upon the Model Penal Code
provides a fertile ground for the application of individual, subjec-
tive notions of what the requisite degree of gravity of risk ought to
be in a given case is a reasonably certain observation. 66 That the
Model Penal Code reference to "substantial risk" of grave physical
defect, for example, in essence means that statistical probabilities
are involved is also a reasonably certain notion:' 7
162. Ziff, supra note 3, at 23. See also Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social
Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 237, 242-43 (1970), and Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of
Medicine and Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233, 234 (1969).
163. These statutes are cited in notes 96-99, supra.
164. The statutes are those of California, Colorado, Delaware and Missouri. They are
cited in notes 114-116 and 119, supra.
165. Moyers, supra note 162, at 243.
166. See Louisell, supra note 162, at 234.




In actual clinical practice we have to act largely on the basis of
statistical likelihood. A 50 percent chance of fetal abnormality
to one couple may not be considered a very severe risk while
another couple may consider a 20 percent risk a hideous gamble.
The doctor simply puts the facts on the table as he views them.
The couple then has to make the decision of whether they think
the risk of malformation justifies termination of pregnancy.
There is no one who can make that decision better than the
husband and wife.16s
The above observations serve to buttress the conclusion of this
writer that there are only two ways to resolve the previously dis-
cussed dilemmas in current abortion statutes. Abortion laws either
ought to be interpreted as making the matter of abortion a strictly
medical concern-so that the decision to allow an abortion to be
done, when made according to statute, is not a matter for review
by the courts 169-or ought to be repealed and replaced by "abortion
on demand" statutes, with a reasonably certain time limit, if so
desired. Either of these two ways serves to fit the crime of abortion
safely within the confines of the procedural due process doctrine.
JEFFREY B. GREEN
168. Id. at 443-44.
169. See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, __, 458 P.2d 194, 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,
366 (1969).
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